I wont to do this neighbourly loike, and let them think thee's gotten awa' o' theeself, but if he cooms oot o' thot parlour awhiles theer't clearing off, he mun' have mercy on his oun
boans, for I wean't.
Meetings with Ukrainian moderates in the homeland reinforced Kysilewsky's growing conviction that OUN tactics and pretensions to speak for all Ukrainians had to be resisted.
The Bureau's British friends also made it clear that OUN tactics brought little credit to the Ukrainian cause.
Because Makohin hoped to curb OUN extremism, the Ukrainian Bureau was prepared to work with but not under the direction of the Nationalists.
Between 1934 and 1938, when the thaw in German-Polish relations forced OUN strategists to temporarily rethink their pro-German orientation, Kysilewsky and the Ukrainian Bureau pursued a modus vivendi with the radical Nationalists.
In 1938 relations between the Ukrainian Bureau and the OUN took a turn for the worse.
When the inevitable happened and Carpatho-Ukraine was annexed by Hungary with Hitler's blessings on the same day that the Germans marched into Prague, Makohin cursed and disavowed the OUN (LAC, MG31 D69, vol.
Above all, he warned the Bureau's Canadian supporters that the OUN and the supporters of Hetman Skoropadsky, who had been mobilizing Ukrainian Canadians since the 1920s (Martynowych 2011), had compromised themselves by endorsing various aspects of Nazi Germany's foreign and domestic policy in their press.
An influential minority of the Ukrainian refugees who immigrated to Canada after the war belonged to the radical Banderite wing of the OUN that had emerged in Europe after 1940 and took their marching orders from leaders headquartered in Munich.
The UVO and OUN are known to have attempted at least sixty assassinations during the interwar years.
During the Great War his comrades in arms included OUN leaders Yevhen Konovalets and Andrii Melnyk, and in 1933 he was trying to return to Ukrainian politics.