PMEUPrinciple of Maximising Expected Utility (risk management)
PMEUPlanning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (Department of Services for Children, Youth, and Their Families; Delaware)
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The counterexamples to the noncausal PMEU arise when some possible actions provide evidence for some relevant states of the world without causing them.
Before he addresses causal decision theory or its axiomatic formulation, though, he first provides a fresh analytic look at the axiomatic systems of Savage (1972) and Jeffrey (1983), both of which were offered to derive the noncausal PMEU. These two theories offer sets of constraints on the agent's ordinal preferences over, respectively, gambles and propositions describing uncertain states of the world (of the form "P prefers x to y"), and each derives a "representation theorem," stating that preferences satisfying the axioms are indistinguishable from preferences formed to maximize expected utility with respect to some probability and utility function.
Of course, there is the other major source of motivation to develop Savageor Jeffrey-like axiomatic systems: decision theorists often think that such systems provide justification for the PMEU. However, Joyce is less than adamant about this point.