The court focused on the differences in opinion and assessment of the three psychologists, (132) and because of their variation, the determination that the general psychological community accepted PNOS as a mental disorder lessened in its validity.
However, numerous courts within Illinois have pushed back on this decision, finding some PNOS determinations are generally accepted , (135) holding that inclusion of a version of PNOS in previous versions of the DSM showed general acceptance by the psychological community, (136) or reasoning that a subset of acceptance in the psychological community indicated acceptance.
Although In re New established new ways to discuss PNOS under the SVPA, many subsequent questions sought to limits the decision.
142) The Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the lower court's finding that the expert could testify the person had a compulsion and an attraction to rape under its subsection of PNOS, and the jury could use this as sufficient to find a "mental disorder.
The court's holding in In re Stanbridge addresses the issue with PNOS: PNOS includes diagnoses like the urge to rape, something that is strongly associated with a mental disorder.
Courts permit diagnoses like inability to control a need to rape to justify a general acceptance of all psychological diagnoses that fall under the PNOS "mental illness" scheme.
In In re Melcher, the defendant argued that an expert's opinion that Melcher had PNOS required a Frye hearing because the specific diagnosis of "PNOS nonconsent" (what was previously used to diagnose rape) was removed from the two newest versions of the DSM.
However, the court still found PNOS applicable because a subset of courts allowed the finding in expert testimony.
It should not merely be that because the person has a diagnosis of PNOS under the DSM, it is a "catch-all" for the SVPA.