So this outcome does not show PPPB to be wrong, either.
Once again, neither outcome assigns moral responsibility where PPPB would deny it.
It is, therefore, that kind of uncoerced action alone that could call PPPB into question, by assigning moral responsibility where PPPB would perhaps deny it.
In short, if Ross' twitch is not definitive of either of his voting choices, then it is no problem for PPPB if Bill can and will intervene should Ross exhibit the twitch.
PPPB, therefore, is immune to Frankfurt's attack, and it is able to resist Fischer's extension of that attack as well.
However, another objection to PPPB may arise from questions regarding my limitations on regresses involving the morally responsible qualification of B.
PPPB has mined these buried suspicions to unearth previously unnoticed leeway in even the specified kinds of cases.
Lastly, I realize some may object to PPPB on the grounds that it construes willings and choosings, and so on, as alternate actions, when such things are often seen as only parts of actions.
PPPB does, indeed, require a smaller extent of leeway than had previously been proposed, but it still involves the agent's truly being able to have done otherwise.