PBE

(redirected from Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium)
AcronymDefinition
PBEPiccola Biblioteca Einaudi (Italian library)
PBEPublic Beta Environment (game software testing)
PBEPlace-Based Education
PBEProtective Breathing Equipment
PBEPerfect Bayesian Equilibrium
PBEPoisson-Boltzmann Equation (physics)
PBEPassword Based Encryption (cryptography)
PBEPreferred Binary Encoding
PBEPassword Based Encryption
PBEParallel Basic E-Books
PBEPerformance Boost Engine
PBEPersonal Belief Exemption
PBEPerformance Based Entry (golf)
PBEPortable Breathing Equipment (aircraft)
PBEPretty Blue Eyes
PBEProgramming By Example
PBEPhilippine Business for Environment (est. 1992)
PBEPersonal Breathing Equipment
PBEPrompt By Example
PBEPro Business Edition (software)
PBEPaint Body Equipment
PBEProduct and Brand Experience (Bavarian Motor Works)
PBEPool Boiling Experiment
PBEPlain Both Ends
PBEPakistan Broadcasting Experience (Pakistan)
PBEProblem Between Ears
PBEPermission-Based Email
PBEPackard Bell Electronics
PBEPeanut Butter Exhibition
PBEPowerful Beautiful Excellent (John Forte song)
PBEPlay by Ear
PBEPrompt Burst Excursion
PBEPrompt Burst Experiment
PBEPopulation-Based Experiment
PBEProfessional Billing Environment
PBEPost Benefit Evaluation (UK)
PBEPreliminary Budget Estimate (various organizations)
PBEPending Break Encoding (computing)
PBEProfessional Broadcast Engineer (certification)
PBEPerdue Burke Ernzerhof (computational chemistry)
References in periodicals archive ?
We need to show that these strategies form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Consider a deviation by a firm offering a menu different from the proposed equilibrium contract, for example, including an undercutting contract (menu).
On the other hand, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which [[lambda].sub.i] = 0 if [V.sub.i] = L and = 1 if [V.sub.i] = H still does not exist in this framework.
Specifically, the separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium would be formalized as follows.
To fully characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we combine these strategies for the union with the union's beliefs that the true value of [pi] is uniformly distributed on [0, [[pi].sub.H]] in the first round and, in the case that [w.sub.1.sup.*] is rejected in the first round, that [pi] is uniformly distributed on [0, [[pi].sub.1] ([w.sub.1.sup.*])].
Example 1 shows a case in which a contract has more than one perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Our solution concept is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Hence, MPC members' strategies will be sequentially rational given their beliefs and the beliefs will be consistent, wherever possible, with the played strategies.
We focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria that minimize the social cost of financial distress (5) while leaving the bank profit constant; i.e, we focus on equilibria (x,[alpha] m, p, M) such that there is no other perfect Bayesian equilibrium (x', [alpha]', m', p', M) satisfying W(x', [alpha]', m' /M) > W(x, [alpha], m/ M) and [[PI].sub.i] (x', [alpha]', m' /M) = [[PI].sub.i] (x, [alpha], m/M) for every i.
(i) The strategy of the firm ([[[pi].sup.*].sub.n], [[[pi].sup.*].sub.r]) = (z, z); the strategy of the worker ([[R.sup.*].sub.1], [[R.sup.*].sub.2], [[phi].sup.*]) = (z, z, 0); and the beliefs ([[[pi].sup.*].sub.n], [[[pi].sup.*].sub.r]) (0, 1) constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. (ii) In the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium described in part (i), all workers accept the first offer they receive and earn a wage, [[w.sup.*].sub.n], equal to the value of leisure, z.
This may tempt us to conclude that the defendant should place zero probability that an out-of-equilibrium offer made subsequent to filing comes from a player with a NEV suit; however, this belief is not ruled out in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, p.
There can exist a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where both types of player 1 eat quiche, and player 2 challenges player 1 to a fight if and only if player 1 has beer for breakfast.
In the framework of this imperfect-information bargaining game, the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium is analyzed and applied to how the class of pure-strategy equilibria depends on the probability of observing the contract between the agent and his delegate.