Asking a program office how much it will save by an R-TOC effort is rather like asking a person the distance of the path he or she didn't take and comparing it to the one taken.
After introduction to the field or fleet, TOC has typically become an issue, and R-TOC efforts have been initiated in response--precisely at the point in development where such efforts are becoming more costly and less effective.
Up-front planning can result in major TOC savings, but JCIDS offers little emphasis on CAIV and R-TOC at the front end of the process (i.e., in Concept Refinement and Technology Development phases).
The R-TOC success hinges on finding the cost drivers and addressing them with innovative R-TOC solutions.
Given the expense and difficulty of modernization, R-TOC is not currently a viable solution to this problem.
Some other reasons why R-TOC currently can't succeed can be found by looking at the shortfalls between projected budgets in contrast to future force structure requirements and the lack of buy-in from operational commands.
Additionally, R-TOC exists as an outgrowth of an acquisition community plan to aid in reprogramming O&M funds.
Any potential savings due to successful R-TOC initiatives, while substantial in terms of incremental benefits to operational accounts, does not create enough lumpsum funding to adequately recapitalize on the scale necessary to modernize the military forces.
R-TOC is one such approach to fund this recapitalization, one that involves identifying a platform's total ownership costs and determining ways to reduce those costs.