Figure 5 shows changes in fluorescence intensities from 310 to 500 nm, with excitation of 220 to 400 nm for RSLB. Figures 5(a) and 5(d) show the reduction in the emission intensities at -320 nm.
From the emission/excitation contour maps, some candidate wavelengths were selected to monitor the oxidative process of SILB and RSLB, as presented in Figure 6.
Figure 7(a) shows the correlation of fluorescence intensity at 424 nm with acid values for RSLB and SILB, respectively.
To execute an RSLB transaction, in effect, a homeowner in foreclosure contracts with a small, non-bank investor to sell the home to the investor, and to rent the home back for a negotiated period of time, usually between two and five years, (10) called the "leaseback period," at a negotiated rent, while retaining the right to repurchase the property at a negotiated price on a negotiated date.
The RSLB rescue transaction arises because certain homeowners lack access to or the ability to qualify for traditional mortgage refinancing and do not trust mainstream banks.
(20) The trapped equity paradox can cause high-equity homeowners to find themselves defaulting on their short-term debt payments and, in the case of RSLB homeowners, facing foreclosure because they cannot meet the monthly mortgage payments on the very home with the equity trapped inside of it.
(201) Critics of the RSLB transaction often accuse investors of seeking out elderly, minority, or poor homeowners.
RSLB transactions are often prevalent, well-known, and oft-discussed in these communities.
In fact, a related twist is the possibility that there is actual sophistication in certain communities about RSLB transactions, which would lead to homeowners acting in their own best interests, exploiting the weaknesses of the contracts and conferring with one another about what the investors call "the best methods to beat the system." Indeed, these community resources, coupled with homeowners' conversations with the investors and lenders, and the written contract itself, combine to suggest full understanding.
For most of the problems in the RSLB marketplace, this Article argues that the best legal solution is to preempt the problems with market-facilitating regulation, thereby avoiding criminal or civil litigation altogether.
Part II will describe the unique market failure that the RSLB transaction emerged to combat, which is coined here as the "trapped equity paradox," and explain why that failure exists.
Part III will introduce and examine the market's own solution to the paradox, the RSLB transaction, and will present a previously unexamined view to demonstrate the logic and structure of the RSLB marketplace.