13) However, a psychologist's diagnosis of a "mental disorder" under the DSM fails to differentiate general mental illnesses from "mental disorders" sufficient to satisfy the second element of the SVPA.
16) Under the Frye hearing suggestion, Illinois courts would be able to determine what constitutes a "mental disorder" under the SVPA and what falls under a mental illness with the DSM.
Part I of this Comment addresses the SVPA, its implementation, its purposes and goals, and the inherent liberty issues the statute raises.
requires proof that the person "suffers from a
15) Judge Allegrucci, writing for the court, asserted that confinement under the SVPA is unconstitutional absent a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior.
Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the majority misinterpreted the precedent set by Hendricks and the very language of the SVPA.
Justice Scalia also argued that the Hendricks opinion explicitly recognizes that the SVPA reaches individuals with not only volitional impairments but also those with other mental illnesses such as personality disorders and emotional and volitional impairments.
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, holding that the SVPA was not punitive because it did not further the goals of retribution or deterrence.
Hendricks argued that the SVPA was different from other civil commitment statutes that had been upheld as non-penal because it did not require the state to attempt to cure him so that he could be released.
In one ruling, the court held that under the SVPA an inmate could be subjected to civil commitment upon release from prison only if the offense for which the inmate is currently serving time is a qualifying "sexually violent offense.
Guided by this principle, the court concluded that the SVPA requires that a prisoner must be serving an active sentence for a sexually violent offense to be subject to commitment.
The Virginia General Assembly during its 2005 legislative session modified the language of the SVPA to encompass inmates who are either (i) incarcerated for sexually violent offenses or (ii) serving concurrent or consecutive time for other offenses in addition to time for a sexually violent offense.