The second obstacle also comes in the guise of a narrow interpretation of Article XXV of the TFCN.
This said, the two above-mentioned attempts at a restrictive interpretation of the TFCN are insufficient to explain why German firms have not even attempted to use the relevant treaty provision as a means of incorporating under U.
Consider first, the issue of whether the TFCN deals with the question of which corporate law regime is to apply.
Similarly, the Bundesgerichtshof has never addressed the question of whether the TFCN applies only to those foreign corporations that have a genuine link with the state of incorporation.
62 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 195, 211 (1998) (noting that the relevant treaty provision does not replace the real seat rule as a whole); see also Bernhard Grossfeld & Susanne Erlinghagen, Internationales Unternehmensrecht und deutsche unternehmerische Mitbestimmung [International Corporate Law and German Codetermination], 48 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 217, 224-25 (1993) (on file with author) (arguing that the TFCN prescribes at most the internal affairs doctrine with regard to the legal capacity of corporations but leaving open the possibility that the TFCN does not concern conflict of laws questions at all).
25 of the TFCN allows German firms to avoid the rules on codetermination); Susan Wessels & Hans-Jorg Ziegenhain, Sitz und Grundungstheorie im internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht [Real Seat Doctrine and State of Incorporation Doctrine in International Corporate Law], 77 GMBH-RUNDSCHAU [GMBHR] 423, 431 (1988) (on file with author); see also Hartwin Bungert, Rechtsfahigkeit US-amerikanischer Kapitalgesellschaften ohne geschaftlichen Schwerpunkt in den USA [Legal Capacity of U.