IFB offers a broad range of services which are indeed akin to those of TIFB such as Koran courses, religious education for children and youths, language courses, mosque services, funeral funds, hajj pilgrimages, etc.
TIFB and IFB can best be described as competitors in the same 'religious market', akin to Kastoryano's ethnic market, (49) with slightly differentiated services to provide.
IFB with its emphasis on applying Islamic principles in every aspect of life distinguishes itself from TIFB and its secular understanding of Islam.
Another instance of disparity -or difference of strategy- between TIFB and IFB is that IFB's discourse is not motivated by an appeal only to Turkish fellow citizens.
There seems to be a consensus in the Turkish community -including TIFB officials- that Milli Gorus has toned down the radical elements of its discourse.
A similar rapprochement can be noticed between TIFB and IFB, at least in the rhetoric, despite the aforementioned ideological differences between them.
TIFB was reluctant to participate in the first elections held in 1998.
It should be noted here that TIFB describes the particularities of each Muslim community in national cultural terms rather than religious.
The comparison made with the federal structure of the Belgian government, overwhelmed with disagreements between the two constituent communities, is used by TIFB to legitimize the need for autonomous but confederated units.
In general, TIFB assumes a self-appointed spokesperson role on behalf of the Turkish community.
For instance, the reluctance of TIFB to participate in the 1998 elections was interpreted as the Turkish community's disapproval of the process, while TIFB's participation in 2005 elections was used to overcome the Turkish community's image as an obstacle.