In the end, UNOMSA decided to operate in Bophuthatswana unannounced and uninvited, which it did until March 1994 when a popular uprising toppled its puppet president.
As UNOMSA concluded, 'media coverage of the electoral process was balanced and did not disadvantage any one political party'.(79)
So concerned was UNOMSA at the prospect of a breakdown of security that it asked that the Security Council require it to 'monitor the compliance of the security forces' with the provisions of the relevant laws and TEC decisions.(80) All the observer missions included members with substantial police experience.
As the UN report explains: 'The extent to which UNOMSA was able to monitor the actual conduct of the count was limited by the need, for budgetary reasons, to withdraw most international electoral observers before the end of the count'.
However, when the UNOMSA chief of mission suggested that it might be 'logical' to withdraw these privileges in due course in the interests of levelling the playing field, the PAC (which was sensitive to the charge of terrorism) was outraged.(85) Observers also learned to be discreet in their dealings with the security services, as they were noted for their generosity with gifts, trips and invitations to brais.
UNOMSA planning for the election began early in 1993.
The General Assembly and the Security Council were in conflict over control of UNOMSA.
UNOMSA, 'Elections in South Africa', 9 November 1993, p.
South Africa was not asked to share the cost of UNOMSA with the UN, though it was financially able to do so.
UNOMSA, 'First Quarterly Report', December 1992, p.
One UNOMSA observer has noted that: 'New York in my experience never came back to the Mission on matters raised in its reports'.
One UNOMSA observer took it upon himself to act as adviser to Holomisa on how to handle his conflict with Pretoria over the alleged APLA bases in Transkei.