While we recognize that this picture is natural--especially upon reflection on the basic structure of buck-passing accounts of value--we think that it ultimately misses the key lessons of the WKR problem.
Indeed, there is pressure for the reasons fundamentalist who wants to write off the WKR problem as everybody's problem to insist that this distinction is a distinction among reasons.
The upshot is that the generality of the WKR problem shows that not all RKRS are normative reasons, for some standards of correctness are normatively anemic.
We agree that the WKR problem is everybody's problem.
This simple account, of course, faces the WKR problem.
Perhaps everyone should expect there to be a solution to the WKR problem for "amusing" and "shocking." But it will not give the buck-passer everything she needs.
But we can see from reflecting on the generality of the WKR problem that not all right-kind reasons for pro-attitudes are value-grounding in that sense.
The bottom line, then, is that one should not claim that right-kind considerations and normative reasons are different kinds of things; indeed, as we noted earlier, one cannot make this claim without abandoning the "everybody's problem" response to the WKR problem.
So a WKR problem can arise for these ritualistic killings.
The first key moral is that the generality of the WKR/RKR distinction shows that there is another problem that is structurally similar to the WKR Problem.
And the WKR problem clearly forces the fundamentalist to say something about this.