To capture wPFS, Type One adversary is allowed to obtain the static secret keys of parties [A.sup.*] and [B.sup.*] by corrupting [A.sup.*] and [B.sup.*] (but Type Two adversary is not allowed to corrupt either [A.sup.*] or [B.sup.*]).
To address wPFS in our security proof, Type Four adversary A is allowed to obtain the static secret keys of parties [A.sup.*] and [B.sup.*] by corrupting both parties (a Type Three or Type Fi ve adversary is not allowed to corrupt party [A.sup.*] or [B.sup.*]).
Note that NAXOS , CMQV , and HMQV  referred to exponentiation computation and achieve AKE security with wPFS in GDH assumption which indicated that they were vulnerable to quantum attack although they are secure in stronger model.
Security analysis with wPFS is proved to resist five kinds of adversaries under the BR model and it might be appealing in specific applications.
If our lattice-based AKE is improved, it may achieve CPA and CCA security with wPFS, PFS, KCI, and so on under the CK, eCK, and [CK.sup.+] model.
To capture wPFS , A can corrupt an honest party of a session [sid.sup.*].
In one house, real-time particle counts were also assessed, and respirator-efficiency testing was performed to establish workplace protection factors (WPF).
The average WPF against fungal spores for elastomeric respirators was higher than for the N-95 respirators.
We performed respirator-efficiency testing by measuring workplace protection factor (WPF) against fungal spores collected in house 3.
The WPF values for the two types of tested respirators are presented in Table 4.
By the time we planned the initial visit to house 3, we were able to characterize the particle sizes and conduct experiments to test the WPF of a disposable N-95 respirator and an elastomeric half-facepiece respirator.
We found that, in the field, the WPF was lower for the N-95 respirator.