GDF

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AcronymDefinition
GDFGaz De France
GDFGovernment(-wide) Data Files
GDFGuardia di Finanza (Italian Revenue Guard Corps)
GDFGoverno do Distrito Federal (Federal District Government; Brazil)
GDFGrowth/Differentiation Factor
GDFGlobal Development Finance (World Bank)
GDFGasoline Dispensing Facility
GDFGlobal Drug Facility (tuberculosis treatment; est. 2001)
GDFGeographic Data File
GDFGuide Dog Foundation
GDFGroup Distribution Frame
GDFGuidance for Development of the Force
GDFGrateful Dead Family
GDFGábor Dénes Fõiskola (Gabor Denes Technical College, Budapest, Hungary)
GDFGuyanese Defense Force
GDFGrateful Dead Forum
GDFGlobal Development Forum
GDFGlobal Delivery Framework
GDFGoodfellow AFB (San Angelo, TX)
GDFGreenwich and Docklands Festivals
GDFgridded data field (US DoD)
GDFGroup Decision-Feedback
GDFGovernment Designated Facility
GDFGuinea Development Foundation (New York, NY)
GDFGlobal Development Framework (EU)
References in classic literature ?
They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the FEDERAL form, which regards the Union as a CONFEDERACY of sovereign states; instead of which, they have framed a NATIONAL government, which regards the Union as a CONSOLIDATION of the States.
Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the objection is founded, it will be necessary to a just estimate of its force, first, to ascertain the real character of the government in question; secondly, to inquire how far the convention were authorized to propose such a government; and thirdly, how far the duty they owed to their country could supply any defect of regular authority.
In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered in relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be introduced.
The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to be derived.
Because when once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or other contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government, -- especially as it will have the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States.
Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner, -- whereas, adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and independent governments, as from the different local laws and interests which may affect and influence them.
Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and consequently having little or no influence on the national government, the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved.
But the national government, not being affected by those local circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.
The opponents of the plan proposed have, with great assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government.
Referring the examination of the principle itself to another place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here that, in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of the more considerable MEMBERS of the Union, but would not militate against their being all comprehended in one confederate government.
So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a confederate republic as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.
It is very probable," (says he[1]) "that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government.
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